Miners can be paid in two ways. The basic one is the remuneration for confirming transactions in the form of newly created coins. The second way is to participate in transaction fees that are charged to cryptocurrency users. Let's take a closer look at this second method - it turns out that sometimes transaction fees can be a significant component in remuneration. The best example of this is the current situation on the Ethereum network, where the level of fees is very high. Transaction fees Depending on the scalability of a given cryptocurrency blockchain, it may have different bandwidth, which translates into the ability to efficiently add new transactions to the blocks. By convention, when network traffic is moderate, transactions are added on a regular basis and the fee level is relatively low. At times when network traffic is heavy, network congestion occurs, and as a result, users should increase the transaction fee to ensure that transactions are added quickly. Only transactions with higher commission will be handled by miners in the first place. In the history of cryptocurrencies, we have had periods of increased activity several times. Thus, in the Bitcoin network, it was the fever associated with the record valuation of the turn of 2017/2018. At peak moments, the cost of adding transactions to the network could be as high as 50USD. In the Ethereum network, the most famous was the boom associated with CryptoKitty, which overloaded the network for weeks. What is the situation in the Ethereum network? Currently in the Ethereum network the level of fees is very high, the base value of a block is 2 ether, currently the salaries range from 2.3-2.6 ether. For a miner, this means an average income of 15-30% more than the norm. The Ethereum development team recognized this phenomenon and started working on making the charging system more flexible. This is the essence of the motivation in the creation of EIP1559. The idea is that the transaction fee system found in Ethereum is sub-optimal and rewards overpaying, and a way to improve this system would be to introduce a mechanism that would match the basic network fee to the network demand. This would increase the efficiency of the network fee level and reduce the complexity of the part of the software found in Ethereum-enabled clients (wallets) that are responsible for estimating the correct network fee level. In the current system, a newly submitted transaction must wait until it is included in the next block produced by the miner. Currently, the easiest way to guarantee a place in the next block is for such a waiting transaction to increase its "gasPrice" parameter above the average found in the network. The miner always tries to fill new blocks with transactions that will increase his salary, and a transaction with a high "gasPrice" fulfills this condition 100%. The problem with such a system is that at times of high demand, the level of network fees can quickly reach unreasonably high values. When blocks are almost full, users start bidding "who gives more" and artificially inflate the value of the network fee just to secure a place in the next block. Miners, in order to somehow minimize the impact of this phenomenon, have the ability to increase the number of transactions that can fit into the next block. However, this mechanism is not able to change very quickly. There is also a second fact. From the miner's point of view, it is more profitable to be satisfied with a small but full block than to increase the "gas limit" due to the increased risk of "Uncle (i.e., digging up an incomplete block). In particular, if a portfolio prioritizes the inclusion of a block in the network within a certain short time frame, it may happen that you have to pay a network fee worth several times the value of the transaction that is transmitted. To combat this phenomenon, EIP 1559 introduces the concept of a "basic network fee" that is supposed to dynamically adjust in such a way that the total consumption of "gas" is supposed to aim at a value of 10 million. In addition, instead of going into the pockets of miners, the "basic network fee" will be burned, so that these coins are irretrievably destroyed. However, there will be an option for the person sending the transaction to include an additional "tip", which will go to the miner who makes such a transaction in the block. The great advantage of the fact that the basic transaction fee does not change abruptly in response to momentary network demand is that users are protected from the consequences of the "bidding up" phenomenon. Because the basic transaction fee is burned and not credited to miners' accounts, miners have no basis for attempting to manipulate the value of the transaction fee to increase the wages they receive. The third advantage is an attempt to address the problem of automatically estimating o
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